The Bill of Federalism
Article [of Amendment 8] — [Balanced Budget Veto]Proposed Text
Section 1. For purposes of this article, the budget of the United States for any given fiscal year shall be deemed unbalanced whenever the total amount of the debt of the United States held by the public at the close of such fiscal year is greater than the total amount of the debt of the United States held by the public at the close of the preceding fiscal year. Section 2. If the budget of the United States is unbalanced for any given fiscal year, the President may separately approve, reduce or disapprove any monetary amounts in any legislation that appropriates or authorizes the appropriation of any money drawn from the Treasury, other than money for the operation of the Congress and judiciary of the United States, and which is presented to the President during the next annual session of Congress. Section 3. Any legislation that the President approves with changes pursuant to section 2 of this article shall become law as modified. The President shall return with objections those portions of the legislation containing reduced or disapproved monetary amounts to the House where such legislation originated, which may then, in the manner prescribed under section 7 of Article I for bills disapproved by the President, separately reconsider those reduced or disapproved monetary amounts. Section 4. The Congress shall have the power to implement this article by appropriate legislation. Section 5. This article shall take effect on the first day of the next annual session of Congress following its ratification.
Professor Barnett's Commentary
Many Americans have long desired both a balance budget amendment and a presidential line item veto. The Problems With Balanced Budget Amendments: Balance budget mechanisms that have been devised to date present three serious problems: They are highly complex, they typically contain numerous exceptions and loop-holes, and they lack effective means of enforcement. The Need for a Line Item Veto: The practice by Congress of aggregating thousands of lines of expenditures into “omnibus” appropriation bills has greatly diminished the veto power that the Constitution reposes in the President. Because of their reluctance to threaten a government shut down, Presidents are loath to veto such bills. Knowing this, Senators and Representatives can load spending bills with pork, knowing that Congress will never have to give an up or down floor vote to a particular line item and that the threat of a presidential veto is empty. By linking the goal of a balanced budget with a temporary presidential line-item veto, the eighth proposed amendment provides a real incentive for Congress to devise a balance budget; if Congress fails to do so, the President would then have a temporary line item veto power over any appropriation in the budget. For example, should Congress enact a budget with a deficit, the President could veto Congressional earmarks and be held accountable for failing to do so. The amendment also ensures that Congress will retain the same power to override any presidential line item veto as it currently has for a traditional veto. The operation and advantages of this measure over other balance budget amendments is explained in detail here: www.cato.org/pubs/pa s/pa-487es.html
Public Comment Section on the Second Amendment of the Bill of Federalism