Expansion of presidential power | US government and civics | Khan Academy
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Expansion of presidential power | US government and civics | Khan Academy

– [Instructor] What we’re going
to talk about in this video is the expansion of presidential power. We’ve already seen that the
Constitution talks about the different powers that
a president would have. But as we’ve gone forward in history, the Constitution hasn’t
imagined every circumstance that the president might face,
and so there have been times when the presidents have used powers that aren’t explicitly
given in the Constitution. For example, as early as 1803, you have the Louisiana Purchase, where you have Thomas
Jefferson buying land from Napoleon’s France. It does not say explicitly
anywhere in the Constitution that presidents are allowed to buy land from foreign countries. You fast-forward a good bit
to the Great Depression. You have Franklin Delano Roosevelt who serves four terms in
office, four terms in office, and also starts creating all
of these various agencies in order to help stimulate the
economy, so creates agencies. And many of the things that he did were not explicitly listed
as powers of the president. And as you can imagine, as
any member of the government, especially the president,
starts taking on powers that aren’t explicitly listed, it make make other people
a little bit afraid. And so in reaction to some of this, there have been actions taken. For example, because
FDR had his four terms, you have the 22nd Amendment. And the 22nd Amendment says
that no one can be elected to the office of the
president more than two times, and no one can serve more
than 10 years in office. The 10 years would become a problem if you can take on office in the second half of someone else’s administration and then you get elected twice. And so the 22nd Amendment
was really a check on this type of expansion
of presidential power. Later on, you have things
like the War Powers Act. Let me write that, War Powers
Act, which is from 1973, and this is at the end of the Vietnam War. Congress has been concerned. How did we get embroiled in the war, a war, that in the early days, did not have any type of
official authorization from Congress, but American
troops were put on the ground in a foreign country. And so the War Powers Act in
1973 says that a president has to get congressional
buy-in within 60 days of committing American troops. But to help us understand this issue, let’s go all the way back
to the Federalist Papers. Remember, the Federalist Papers
were written in an attempt to get the Constitution ratified. And for the sake of this
video, we’re going to focus on Federalist number 70, written
by Alexander Hamilton. In Federalist number 70,
Alexander Hamilton makes the case why you need to have a single individual who has significant power at the head of the Executive Branch. And you can imagine this would
have made some people wary because the United States
had just gotten independence from George III, a king, and so some people might
have been wary about kings, and might have wanted, maybe
not one person in charge, or maybe a committee in charge. But this is what Hamilton wrote. Energy in the Executive
is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the
protection of the community against foreign attacks;
it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property
against those irregular and high-handed combinations
which sometimes interrupt the ordinary of justice;
to the security of liberty against the enterprises
and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy… A feeble Executive
implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and
a government ill executed, whatever it may be in
theory, must, in practice, a bad government… That unity is conducive to
energy will not be disputed. Decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch will generally characterize
the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent
degree than the proceedings of any greater number, and in proportion as the number is increased, that qualities will be diminished… So he’s making the argument
for an energetic executive, and he’s saying that, “Look, that power needs to be one person.” Otherwise, it’s going
be diluted amongst many, and the more people you have
at the top of the executive, then these qualities of
energy, of decisiveness, are going to be diminished. And it’s interesting. He also talks about secrecy,
which you don’t always view as a positive, but maybe the argument is if you really need to execute well, you don’t have to tell
everyone what you’re doing, especially if you’re
trying to conduct a war and you don’t want national
secrets to get out. The plurality of the Executive
tends to deprive the people of the two greatest
securities they can have for the faithful exercise
of any delegated power. So here he’s further
building the case that hey, if you have many people in the executive, at the head of the executive, it’s going to deprive the
people of two great securities. First, the restraints of public opinion, which lose their efficacy,
as well on account of the division of the censure
attendant on bad measures among a number, as on
account of the uncertainty on whom it ought to fall. So he’s saying the
restraints of public opinion don’t work as well if there’s
many people at the top. If many people are making
these executive decisions, then they don’t know
who to hold accountable. They don’t know who to blame. And secondly, the opportunity
of discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct
of the persons they trust, in order either to their
removal from office or to their actual punishment
in cases which admit of it… So once again, they’re
saying if it’s one person leading the executive and
they do something bad, you can punish them. You can remove them from office. But if it’s many people, who do you blame? It might not be easy to
hold them accountable. But then if we fast-forward to 1973, think about the situation
that the country was in. We were at the end of the Vietnam War. President Nixon was going through the Watergate investigations, and you have the author
Arthur Schlesinger Jr. writes The Imperial presidency. And it says right over here, “The Pulitzer Prize-winning
historian traces the escalation “of Presidential power and
considers what Congress “and the people can do about it.” And here is an excerpt of what he wrote. Secrecy seemed to promise government three inestimable advantages:
the power to withhold, the power to leak and the power to lie… So it’s clear that Arthur
Schlesinger is not as big of a fan as secrecy as Alexander Hamilton was. The power to withhold held out the hope of denying the public the
knowledge that would make possible an independent judgment
on executive policy. The mystique of inside
information — “if you only knew “what we know” — was a
most effective way to defend the national security monopoly and prevent democratic
control of foreign policy… So he’s saying, look, if you allow people to just not tell you things,
they’ll just say, hey, if you only knew what we knew, you would do what we’re
doing, but we can’t tell you what we know, so you
just have to trust us. The power to leak meant the
power to tell the people what it served the government’s purpose that they should know… So once again, they can
hold secret, and say, “Hey, trust us. We’re doing
what’s the right thing,” but then they could selectively leak so that only certain information gets out that once again, could be in
the interest of those in power. The power to withhold and the
power to leak lead inexorably to the power to lie. The secrecy system instilled
in the executive branch the idea that foreign
policy was no one’s business save its own, and the
uncontrolled secrecy made it easy for lying to become routine. It was in this spirit
that Eisenhower concealed the CIA operations it was
mounting against governments around the world. It was in this spirit that
the Kennedy administration stealthily sent the Cuban
brigade to the Bay of Pigs, and stealthily enlarged
American involvement in Vietnam. It was in this spirit that
the Johnson administration Americanized the Vietnam War,
misrepresenting one episode after another to Congress and the people– Tonkin Gulf, which was
the resolution based on a perceived attack on an American ship, which was later judged
to be just an explosion, the first American
ground force commitment, the bombing of North
Vietnam, My Lai and the rest. And the My Lai Massacre
is a famous massacre that eventually got out
and it showed a massacre of civilians in Vietnam. But I’ll let you decide. And it doesn’t have to be the case that Alexander Hamilton was right 100% or that Arthus Schlesinger is right 100%. It could be the case that,
well, for the most part, it is important for an
executive to have some degree of secrecy. Even some of the things
that Arthur Schlesinger has talked about, where
we’re talking about the Bay of Pigs or we’re talking
about the CIA operations, remember, this was during the Cold War. You had the Soviet Union out
there with all of its spies. If it knew what was going on, it might be able to
undermine American actions. So some degree of secrecy
absolutely was necessary, but on the other hand,
maybe there is a point that sometimes that secrecy
does allow those in power to do things that would
make the general public very upset about their actions.


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