Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution | Wikipedia audio article
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Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution | Wikipedia audio article


The Fourteenth Amendment (Amendment XIV) to
the United States Constitution was adopted on July 9, 1868, as one of the Reconstruction
Amendments. Arguably one of the most consequential amendments
to this day, the amendment addresses citizenship rights and equal protection of the laws and
was proposed in response to issues related to former slaves following the American Civil
War. The amendment was bitterly contested, particularly
by the states of the defeated Confederacy, which were forced to ratify it in order to
regain representation in Congress. The amendment, particularly its first section,
is one of the most litigated parts of the Constitution, forming the basis for landmark
decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education (1954) regarding racial segregation, Roe v.
Wade (1973) regarding abortion, Bush v. Gore (2000) regarding the 2000 presidential election,
and Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) regarding same-sex marriage. The amendment limits the actions of all state
and local officials, including those acting on behalf of such an official. The amendment’s first section includes several
clauses: the Citizenship Clause, Privileges or Immunities Clause, Due Process Clause,
and Equal Protection Clause. The Citizenship Clause provides a broad definition
of citizenship, nullifying the Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857),
which had held that Americans descended from African slaves could not be citizens of the
United States. Since the Slaughter-House Cases (1873), the
Privileges or Immunities Clause has been interpreted to do very little. The Due Process Clause prohibits state and
local government officials from depriving persons of life, liberty, or property without
legislative authorization. This clause has also been used by the federal
judiciary to make most of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states, as well as to recognize
substantive and procedural requirements that state laws must satisfy. The Equal Protection Clause requires each
state to provide equal protection under the law to all people, including all non-citizens,
within its jurisdiction. This clause has been the basis for many decisions
rejecting irrational or unnecessary discrimination against people belonging to various groups. The second, third, and fourth sections of
the amendment are seldom litigated. However, the second section’s reference to
“…rebellion, or other crime” has been invoked as a constitutional ground for felony disenfranchisement. The fourth section was held, in Perry v. United
States (1935), to prohibit a current Congress from abrogating a contract of debt incurred
by a prior Congress. The fifth section gives Congress the power
to enforce the amendment’s provisions by “appropriate legislation”; however, under City of Boerne
v. Flores (1997), this power may not be used to contradict a Supreme Court decision interpreting
the amendment.==Text==
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among
the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives
in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age,
and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State. Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative
in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military,
under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State
legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution
of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same,
or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds
of each House, remove such disability. Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United
States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties
for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State
shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion
against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but
all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.==Adoption=====Proposal by Congress===
In the final years of the American Civil War and the Reconstruction Era that followed,
Congress repeatedly debated the rights of black former slaves freed by the 1863 Emancipation
Proclamation and the 1865 Thirteenth Amendment, the latter of which had formally abolished
slavery. Following the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment
by Congress, however, Republicans grew concerned over the increase it would create in the congressional
representation of the Democratic-dominated Southern States. Because the full population of freed slaves
would now be counted for determining congressional representation, rather than the three-fifths
previously mandated by the Three-Fifths Compromise, the Southern States would dramatically increase
their power in the population-based House of Representatives, regardless of whether
the former slaves were allowed to vote. Republicans began looking for a way to offset
this advantage, either by protecting and attracting votes of former slaves, or at least by discouraging
their disenfranchisement.In 1865, Congress passed what would become the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, guaranteeing citizenship without regard to race, color, or previous condition
of slavery or involuntary servitude. The bill also guaranteed equal benefits and
access to the law, a direct assault on the Black Codes passed by many post-war states. The Black Codes attempted to return ex-slaves
to something like their former condition by, among other things, restricting their movement,
forcing them to enter into year-long labor contracts, prohibiting them from owning firearms,
and preventing them from suing or testifying in court.Although strongly urged by moderates
in Congress to sign the bill, President Andrew Johnson vetoed it on March 27, 1866. In his veto message, he objected to the measure
because it conferred citizenship on the freedmen at a time when 11 out of 36 states were unrepresented
in the Congress, and that it discriminated in favor of African-Americans and against
whites. Three weeks later, Johnson’s veto was overridden
and the measure became law. Despite this victory, even some Republicans
who had supported the goals of the Civil Rights Act began to doubt that Congress really possessed
constitutional power to turn those goals into laws. The experience also encouraged both radical
and moderate Republicans to seek Constitutional guarantees for black rights, rather than relying
on temporary political majorities. Over 70 proposals for an amendment were drafted. In late 1865, the Joint Committee on Reconstruction
proposed an amendment stating that any citizens barred from voting on the basis of race by
a state would not be counted for purposes of representation of that state. This amendment passed the House, but was blocked
in the Senate by a coalition of Radical Republicans led by Charles Sumner, who believed the proposal
a “compromise with wrong”, and Democrats opposed to black rights. Consideration then turned to a proposed amendment
by Representative John A. Bingham of Ohio, which would enable Congress to safeguard “equal
protection of life, liberty, and property” of all citizens; this proposal failed to pass
the House. In April 1866, the Joint Committee forwarded
a third proposal to Congress, a carefully negotiated compromise that combined elements
of the first and second proposals as well as addressing the issues of Confederate debt
and voting by ex-Confederates. The House of Representatives passed House
Resolution 127, 39th Congress several weeks later and sent to the Senate for action. The resolution was debated and several amendments
to it were proposed. Amendments to Sections 2, 3, and 4 were adopted
on June 8, 1866, and the modified resolution passed by a 33 to 11 vote (5 absent, not voting). The House agreed to the Senate amendments
on June 13 by a 138–36 vote (10 not voting). A concurrent resolution requesting the President
to transmit the proposal to the executives of the several states was passed by both houses
of Congress on June 18.The Radical Republicans were satisfied that they had secured civil
rights for blacks, but were disappointed that the amendment would not also secure political
rights for blacks; in particular, the right to vote. For example, Thaddeus Stevens, a leader of
the disappointed Radical Republicans, said: “I find that we shall be obliged to be content
with patching up the worst portions of the ancient edifice, and leaving it, in many of
its parts, to be swept through by the tempests, the frosts, and the storms of despotism.” Abolitionist Wendell Phillips called it a
“fatal and total surrender”. This point would later be addressed by the
Fifteenth Amendment.===Ratification by the states===On June 16, 1866, Secretary of State William
Seward transmitted the Fourteenth Amendment to the governors of the several states for
its ratification. State legislatures in every formerly Confederate
state, with the exception of Tennessee, refused to ratify it. This refusal led to the passage of the Reconstruction
Acts. Ignoring the existing state governments, military
government was imposed until new civil governments were established and the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified. It also prompted Congress to pass a law on
March 2, 1867, requiring that a former Confederate state must ratify the Fourteenth Amendment
before “said State shall be declared entitled to representation in Congress”.The first twenty-eight
states to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment were:
Connecticut – June 30, 1866 New Hampshire – July 6, 1866
Tennessee – July 18, 1866 New Jersey – September 11, 1866 (rescinded
ratification – February 20, 1868/March 24, 1868; re-ratified – April 23, 2003)
Oregon – September 19, 1866 (rescinded ratification – October 16, 1868; re-ratified – April
25, 1973) Vermont – October 30, 1866
New York – January 10, 1867 Ohio – January 11, 1867 (rescinded ratification
– January 13, 1868; re-ratified – March 12, 2003)
Illinois – January 15, 1867 West Virginia – January 16, 1867
Michigan – January 16, 1867 Minnesota – January 16, 1867
Kansas – January 17, 1867 Maine – January 19, 1867
Nevada – January 22, 1867 Indiana – January 23, 1867
Missouri – January 25, 1867 Pennsylvania – February 6, 1867
Rhode Island – February 7, 1867 Wisconsin – February 13, 1867
Massachusetts – March 20, 1867 Nebraska – June 15, 1867
Iowa – March 16, 1868 Arkansas – April 6, 1868
Florida – June 9, 1868 North Carolina – July 4, 1868 (after rejection
– December 14, 1866) Louisiana – July 9, 1868 (after rejection
– February 6, 1867) South Carolina – July 9, 1868 (after rejection
– December 20, 1866)If rescission by Ohio and New Jersey were invalid, South Carolina
would have been the 28th State. Rescission by Oregon did not occur until later. These rescissions caused significant controversy. However, ratification by other states continued
during the course of the debate: Alabama – July 13, 1868On July 20, 1868,
Secretary of State William H. Seward certified that if withdrawals of ratification by New
Jersey and Ohio were ineffective, then the amendment had become part of the Constitution
on July 9, 1868, with ratification by South Carolina. The following day, Congress adopted and transmitted
to the Department of State a concurrent resolution declaring the Fourteenth Amendment to be a
part of the Constitution and directing the Secretary of State to promulgate it as such. Both New Jersey and Ohio were named in the
congressional resolution as having ratified the amendment, although Alabama was also named,
making 29 states total.On the same day, one more State ratified: Georgia – July 21, 1868 (after rejection
– November 9, 1866)On July 27, Secretary Seward received the formal ratification from
Georgia. The following day, July 28, Secretary Seward
issued his official proclamation certifying the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Secretary Seward stated that his proclamation
was “in conformance” to the resolution by Congress, but his official list of States
included both Alabama and Georgia, as well as Ohio and New Jersey.The inclusion of Ohio
and New Jersey has led some to question the validity of rescission of a ratification. The inclusion of Alabama and Georgia has called
that conclusion into question. While there have been Supreme Court cases
dealing with ratification issues, this particular question has never been adjudicated. The Fourteenth Amendment was subsequently
ratified: Virginia – October 8, 1869 (after rejection
– January 9, 1867) Mississippi – January 17, 1870
Texas – February 18, 1870 (after rejection – October 27, 1866)
Delaware – February 12, 1901 (after rejection – February 8, 1867)
Maryland – April 4, 1959 (after rejection – March 23, 1867)
California – May 6, 1959 Kentucky – March 30, 1976 (after rejection
– January 8, 1867)Since Ohio and New Jersey re-ratified the Fourteenth Amendment in 2003,
all U.S. states that existed during Reconstruction have ratified the amendment.==Citizenship and civil rights=====Background===
Section 1 of the amendment formally defines United States citizenship and also protects
various civil rights from being abridged or denied by any state or state actor. Abridgment or denial of those civil rights
by private persons is not addressed by this amendment; the Supreme Court held in the Civil
Rights Cases (1883) that the amendment was limited to “state action” and, therefore,
did not authorize the Congress to outlaw racial discrimination by private individuals or organizations
(though Congress can sometimes reach such discrimination via other parts of the Constitution). U.S. Supreme Court Justice Joseph P. Bradley
commented in the Civil Rights Cases that “individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter
of the [Fourteenth] Amendment. It has a deeper and broader scope. It nullifies and makes void all state legislation,
and state action of every kind, which impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States, or which injures them in life, liberty or property without due process
of law, or which denies to any of them the equal protection of the laws.”The Radical
Republicans who advanced the Thirteenth Amendment hoped to ensure broad civil and human rights
for the newly freed people—but its scope was disputed before it even went into effect. The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment wanted
these principles enshrined in the Constitution to protect the new Civil Rights Act from being
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court and also to prevent a future Congress from
altering it by a mere majority vote. This section was also in response to violence
against black people within the Southern States. The Joint Committee on Reconstruction found
that only a Constitutional amendment could protect black people’s rights and welfare
within those states.Section 1 has been the most frequently litigated part of the amendment,
and this amendment in turn has been the most frequently litigated part of the Constitution.===Citizenship Clause===The Citizenship Clause overruled the Supreme
Court’s Dred Scott decision that black people were not citizens and could not become citizens,
nor enjoy the benefits of citizenship. Some members of Congress voted for the Fourteenth
Amendment in order to eliminate doubts about the constitutionality of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, or to ensure that no subsequent Congress could later repeal or alter the main
provisions of that Act. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 had granted citizenship
to all persons born in the United States if they were not subject to a foreign power,
and this clause of the Fourteenth Amendment constitutionalized this rule. There are varying interpretations of the original
intent of Congress and of the ratifying states, based on statements made during the congressional
debate over the amendment, as well as the customs and understandings prevalent at that
time. Some of the major issues that have arisen
about this clause are the extent to which it included Native Americans, its coverage
of non-citizens legally present in the United States when they have a child, whether the
clause allows revocation of citizenship, and whether the clause applies to illegal immigrants. Historian Eric Foner, who has explored the
question of U.S. birthright citizenship to other countries, argues that:Many things claimed
as uniquely American—a devotion to individual freedom, for example, or social opportunity—exist
in other countries. But birthright citizenship does make the United
States (along with Canada) unique in the developed world. […] Birthright citizenship is one expression
of the commitment to equality and the expansion of national consciousness that marked Reconstruction. […] Birthright citizenship is one legacy
of the titanic struggle of the Reconstruction era to create a genuine democracy grounded
in the principle of equality.====Native Americans====
During the original congressional debate over the amendment Senator Jacob M. Howard of Michigan—the
author of the Citizenship Clause—described the clause as having the same content, despite
different wording, as the earlier Civil Rights Act of 1866, namely, that it excludes Native
Americans who maintain their tribal ties and “persons born in the United States who are
foreigners, aliens, who belong to the families of ambassadors or foreign ministers.” According to historian Glenn W. LaFantasie
of Western Kentucky University, “A good number of his fellow senators supported his view
of the citizenship clause.” Others also agreed that the children of ambassadors
and foreign ministers were to be excluded.Senator James Rood Doolittle of Wisconsin asserted
that all Native Americans were subject to United States jurisdiction, so that the phrase
“Indians not taxed” would be preferable, but Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Lyman
Trumbull and Howard disputed this, arguing that the federal government did not have full
jurisdiction over Native American tribes, which govern themselves and make treaties
with the United States. In Elk v. Wilkins (1884), the clause’s meaning
was tested regarding whether birth in the United States automatically extended national
citizenship. The Supreme Court held that Native Americans
who voluntarily quit their tribes did not automatically gain national citizenship. The issue was resolved with the passage of
the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, which granted full U.S. citizenship to indigenous
peoples.====Children born to foreign nationals====
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that children born in the United States and subject to its
jurisdiction become American citizens at birth. At the time of the amendment’s passage, President
Andrew Johnson and three Senators, including Trumbull, the author of the Civil Rights Act,
asserted that both the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment would confer citizenship
to children born to foreign nationals in the United States. Senator Edgar Cowan of Pennsylvania had a
decidedly different opinion. Some scholars dispute whether the Citizenship
Clause should apply to the children of unauthorized immigrants today, as “the problem … did
not exist at the time”. In the 21st century, Congress has occasionally
discussed passing a statute or a constitutional amendment to reduce the practice of “birth
tourism”, in which a foreign national gives birth in the United States to gain the child’s
citizenship.The clause’s meaning with regard to a child of immigrants was tested in United
States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898). The Supreme Court held that under the Fourteenth
Amendment, a man born within the United States to Chinese citizens who have a permanent domicile
and residence in the United States and are carrying out business in the United States—and
whose parents were not employed in a diplomatic or other official capacity by a foreign power—was
a citizen of the United States. Subsequent decisions have applied the principle
to the children of foreign nationals of non-Chinese descent.According to the Foreign Affairs Manual,
which is published by the Department of State, “Despite widespread popular belief, U.S. military
installations abroad and U.S. diplomatic or consular facilities abroad are not part of
the United States within the meaning of the [Fourteenth] Amendment.”====Loss of citizenship====
Loss of national citizenship is possible only under the following circumstances: Fraud in the naturalization process. Technically, this is not a loss of citizenship
but rather a voiding of the purported naturalization and a declaration that the immigrant never
was a citizen of the United States. Affiliation with “anti-American” organizations
(e.g., the Communist party, terrorist organizations, etc.) within 5 years of naturalization. The State Department views such affiliations
as sufficient evidence that an applicant must have lied or concealed evidence in the naturalization
process. Other-than-honorable discharge from the U.S.
armed forces before 5 years of honorable service, if honorable service was the basis for the
naturalization. Voluntary relinquishment of citizenship. This may be accomplished either through renunciation
procedures specially established by the State Department or through other actions that demonstrate
desire to give up national citizenship.For much of the country’s history, voluntary acquisition
or exercise of a foreign citizenship was considered sufficient cause for revocation of national
citizenship. This concept was enshrined in a series of
treaties between the United States and other countries (the Bancroft Treaties). However, the Supreme Court repudiated this
concept in Afroyim v. Rusk (1967), as well as Vance v. Terrazas (1980), holding that
the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment barred the Congress from revoking citizenship. However, Congress can revoke citizenship that
it had previously granted to a person not born in the United States.===Privileges or Immunities Clause===The Privileges or Immunities Clause, which
protects the privileges and immunities of national citizenship from interference by
the states, was patterned after the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, which
protects the privileges and immunities of state citizenship from interference by other
states. In the Slaughter-House Cases (1873), the Supreme
Court concluded that the Constitution recognized two separate types of citizenship—”national
citizenship” and “state citizenship”—and the Court held that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause prohibits states from interfering only with privileges and immunities possessed by
virtue of national citizenship. The Court concluded that the privileges and
immunities of national citizenship included only those rights that “owe their existence
to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws.” The Court recognized few such rights, including
access to seaports and navigable waterways, the right to run for federal office, the protection
of the federal government while on the high seas or in the jurisdiction of a foreign country,
the right to travel to the seat of government, the right to peaceably assemble and petition
the government, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the right to participate
in the government’s administration. This decision has not been overruled and has
been specifically reaffirmed several times. Largely as a result of the narrowness of the
Slaughter-House opinion, this clause subsequently lay dormant for well over a century. In Saenz v. Roe (1999), the Court ruled that
a component of the “right to travel” is protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause:Despite
fundamentally differing views concerning the coverage of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, most notably expressed in the majority and dissenting opinions
in the Slaughter-House Cases (1873), it has always been common ground that this Clause
protects the third component of the right to travel. Writing for the majority in the Slaughter-House
Cases, Justice Miller explained that one of the privileges conferred by this Clause “is
that a citizen of the United States can, of his own volition, become a citizen of any
State of the Union by a bona fide residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens
of that State.” (emphasis added) Justice Miller actually wrote in the Slaughter-House
Cases that the right to become a citizen of a state (by residing in that state) “is conferred
by the very article under consideration” (emphasis added), rather than by the “clause” under
consideration.In McDonald v. Chicago (2010), Justice Clarence Thomas, while concurring
with the majority in incorporating the Second Amendment against the states, declared that
he reached this conclusion through the Privileges or Immunities Clause instead of the Due Process
Clause. Randy Barnett has referred to Justice Thomas’s
concurring opinion as a “complete restoration” of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.===Due Process Clause===In the 1884 case of Hurtado v. California,
the U.S. Supreme Court said: Due process of law in the [Fourteenth Amendment]
refers to that law of the land in each state which derives its authority from the inherent
and reserved powers of the state, exerted within the limits of those fundamental principles
of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions,
and the greatest security for which resides in the right of the people to make their own
laws, and alter them at their pleasure. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
applies only against the states, but it is otherwise textually identical to the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which applies against the federal government; both clauses
have been interpreted to encompass identical doctrines of procedural due process and substantive
due process. Procedural due process is the guarantee of
a fair legal process when the government tries to interfere with a person’s protected interests
in life, liberty, or property, and substantive due process is the guarantee that the fundamental
rights of citizens will not be encroached on by government. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
also incorporates most of the provisions in the Bill of Rights, which were originally
applied against only the federal government, and applies them against the states.====Substantive due process====Beginning with Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897),
the Court interpreted the Due Process Clause as providing substantive protection to private
contracts, thus prohibiting a variety of social and economic regulation; this principle was
referred to as “freedom of contract.” Thus, the Court struck down a law decreeing
maximum hours for workers in a bakery in Lochner v. New York (1905) and struck down a minimum
wage law in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (1923). In Meyer v. Nebraska (1923), the Court stated
that the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause [w]ithout doubt…denotes not merely freedom
from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any
of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home
and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men. However, the Court did uphold some economic
regulation, such as state Prohibition laws (Mugler v. Kansas, 1887), laws declaring maximum
hours for mine workers (Holden v. Hardy, 1898), laws declaring maximum hours for female workers
(Muller v. Oregon, 1908), and President Woodrow Wilson’s intervention in a railroad strike
(Wilson v. New, 1917), as well as federal laws regulating narcotics (United States v.
Doremus, 1919). The Court repudiated, but did not explicitly
overrule, the “freedom of contract” line of cases in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937).In
Poe v. Ullman (1961), dissenting judge John Marshall Harlan II adopted a broad view of
the “liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause: [T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed
by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the
specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This ‘liberty’ is not a series of isolated
points pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press,
and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly
speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints,
. . . and which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain
interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their
abridgment. This broad view of liberty was adopted by
the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut (for further information see below). Although the “freedom of contract” described
above has fallen into disfavor, by the 1960s, the Court had extended its interpretation
of substantive due process to include other rights and freedoms that are not enumerated
in the Constitution but that, according to the Court, extend or derive from existing
rights. For example, the Due Process Clause is also
the foundation of a constitutional right to privacy. The Court first ruled that privacy was protected
by the Constitution in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), which overturned a Connecticut law
criminalizing birth control. While Justice William O. Douglas wrote for
the majority that the right to privacy was found in the “penumbras” of various provisions
in the Bill of Rights, Justices Arthur Goldberg and John Marshall Harlan II wrote in concurring
opinions that the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause included individual privacy.The
right to privacy was the basis for Roe v. Wade (1973), in which the Court invalidated
a Texas law forbidding abortion except to save the mother’s life. Like Goldberg’s and Harlan’s concurring opinions
in Griswold, the majority opinion authored by Justice Harry Blackmun located the right
to privacy in the Due Process Clause’s protection of liberty. The decision disallowed many state and federal
abortion restrictions, and it became one of the most controversial in the Court’s history. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992), the
Court decided that “the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once
again reaffirmed.”In Lawrence v. Texas (2003), the Court found that a Texas law against same-sex
sexual intercourse violated the right to privacy. In Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), the Court
ruled that the fundamental right to marriage included same-sex couples being able to marry.====Procedural due process====
When the government seeks to burden a person’s protected liberty interest or property interest,
the Supreme Court has held that procedural due process requires that, at a minimum, the
government provide the person notice, an opportunity to be heard at an oral hearing, and a decision
by a neutral decision maker. For example, such process is due when a government
agency seeks to terminate civil service employees, expel a student from public school, or cut
off a welfare recipient’s benefits. The Court has also ruled that the Due Process
Clause requires judges to recuse themselves in cases where the judge has a conflict of
interest. For example, in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. (2009), the Court ruled that
a justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia had to recuse himself from
a case involving a major contributor to his campaign for election to that court.====Incorporation====While many state constitutions are modeled
after the United States Constitution and federal laws, those state constitutions did not necessarily
include provisions comparable to the Bill of Rights. In Barron v. Baltimore (1833), the Supreme
Court unanimously ruled that the Bill of Rights restrained only the federal government, not
the states. However, the Supreme Court has subsequently
held that most provisions of the Bill of Rights apply to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment under a doctrine called “incorporation.”Whether incorporation
was intended by the amendment’s framers, such as John Bingham, has been debated by legal
historians. According to legal scholar Akhil Reed Amar,
the framers and early supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment believed that it would ensure that
the states would be required to recognize the same individual rights as the federal
government; all of these rights were likely understood as falling within the “privileges
or immunities” safeguarded by the amendment.By the latter half of the 20th century, nearly
all of the rights in the Bill of Rights had been applied to the states. The Supreme Court has held that the amendment’s
Due Process Clause incorporates all of the substantive protections of the First, Second,
Fourth, Fifth (except for its Grand Jury Clause) and Sixth Amendments and the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. While the Third Amendment has not been applied
to the states by the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit ruled that it did apply to the states
within that circuit’s jurisdiction in Engblom v. Carey. The Seventh Amendment right to jury trial
in civil cases has been held not to be applicable to the states, but the amendment’s Re-Examination
Clause applies not only to federal courts, but also to “a case tried before a jury in
a state court and brought to the Supreme Court on appeal.”On June 18, 2018, the Supreme Court
agreed to hear Timbs v. Indiana. Timbs will decide whether the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment should be applied to the states.===Equal Protection Clause===The Equal Protection Clause was created largely
in response to the lack of equal protection provided by law in states with Black Codes. Under Black Codes, blacks could not sue, give
evidence, or be witnesses. They also were punished more harshly than
whites. In 1880, the Supreme Court stated in Strauder
v. West Virginia that the Equal Protection Clause was designed to assure to the colored race the
enjoyment of all the civil rights that under the law are enjoyed by white persons, and
to give to that race the protection of the general government, in that enjoyment, whenever
it should be denied by the States. The Clause mandates that individuals in similar
situations be treated equally by the law. Although the text of the Fourteenth Amendment
applies the Equal Protection Clause only against the states, the Supreme Court, since Bolling
v. Sharpe (1954), has applied the Clause against the federal government through the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment under a doctrine called “reverse incorporation.”In Yick Wo
v. Hopkins (1886), the Supreme Court has clarified that the meaning of “person” and “within its
jurisdiction” in the Equal Protection Clause would not be limited to discrimination against
African Americans, but would extend to other races, colors, and nationalities such as (in
this case) legal aliens in the United States who are Chinese citizens:
These provisions are universal in their application to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction,
without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality, and the equal
protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. Persons “within its jurisdiction” are entitled
to equal protection from a state. Largely because the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV has from the beginning guaranteed the privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several states, the Supreme Court has rarely construed the phrase “within
its jurisdiction” in relation to natural persons. In Plyler v. Doe (1982), where the Court held
that aliens illegally present in a state are within its jurisdiction and may thus raise
equal protection claims the Court explicated the meaning of the phrase “within its jurisdiction”
as follows: “[U]se of the phrase “within its jurisdiction” confirms the understanding that
the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection extends to anyone, citizen or stranger, who is subject
to the laws of a State, and reaches into every corner of a State’s territory.” The Court reached this understanding among
other things from Senator Howard, a member of the Joint Committee of Fifteen, and the
floor manager of the amendment in the Senate. Senator Howard was explicit about the broad
objectives of the Fourteenth Amendment and the intention to make its provisions applicable
to all who “may happen to be” within the jurisdiction of a state:
The last two clauses of the first section of the amendment disable a State from depriving
not merely a citizen of the United States, but any person, whoever he may be, of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, or from denying to him the equal protection
of the laws of the State. This abolishes all class legislation in the
States and does away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code
not applicable to another. … It will, if adopted by the States, forever
disable every one of them from passing laws trenching upon those fundamental rights and
privileges which pertain to citizens of the United States, and to all person who may happen
to be within their jurisdiction. [emphasis added by the U.S. Supreme Court]
The relationship between the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments was addressed by Justice Field
in Wong Wing v. United States (1896). He observed with respect to the phrase “within
its jurisdiction”: “The term ‘person,’ used in the Fifth Amendment, is broad enough to
include any and every human being within the jurisdiction of the republic. A resident, alien born, is entitled to the
same protection under the laws that a citizen is entitled to. He owes obedience to the laws of the country
in which he is domiciled, and, as a consequence, he is entitled to the equal protection of
those laws. … The contention that persons within the
territorial jurisdiction of this republic might be beyond the protection of the law
was heard with pain on the argument at the bar—in face of the great constitutional
amendment which declares that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.”The Supreme Court also decided whether foreign corporations
are also within the jurisdiction of a state, ruling that a foreign corporation which sued
in a state court in which it was not licensed to do business to recover possession of property
wrongfully taken from it in another state was within the jurisdiction and could not
be subjected to unequal burdens in the maintenance of the suit. When a state has admitted a foreign corporation
to do business within its borders, that corporation is entitled to equal protection of the laws
but not necessarily to identical treatment with domestic corporations.In Santa Clara
County v. Southern Pacific Railroad (1886), the court reporter included a statement by
Chief Justice Morrison Waite in the decision’s headnote: The court does not wish to hear argument on
the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution,
which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of the opinion that it does. This dictum, which established that corporations
enjoyed personhood under the Equal Protection Clause, was repeatedly reaffirmed by later
courts. It remained the predominant view throughout
the twentieth century, though it was challenged in dissents by justices such as Hugo Black
and William O. Douglas. Between 1890 and 1910, Fourteenth Amendment
cases involving corporations vastly outnumbered those involving the rights of blacks, 288
to 19.In the decades following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court
overturned laws barring blacks from juries (Strauder v. West Virginia, 1880) or discriminating
against Chinese Americans in the regulation of laundry businesses (Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
1886), as violations of the Equal Protection Clause. However, in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), the
Supreme Court held that the states could impose segregation so long as they provided similar
facilities—the formation of the “separate but equal” doctrine.The Court went even further
in restricting the Equal Protection Clause in Berea College v. Kentucky (1908), holding
that the states could force private actors to discriminate by prohibiting colleges from
having both black and white students. By the early 20th century, the Equal Protection
Clause had been eclipsed to the point that Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. dismissed
it as “the usual last resort of constitutional arguments.” The Court held to the “separate but equal”
doctrine for more than fifty years, despite numerous cases in which the Court itself had
found that the segregated facilities provided by the states were almost never equal, until
Brown v. Board of Education (1954) reached the Court. In Brown the Court ruled that even if segregated
black and white schools were of equal quality in facilities and teachers, segregation was
inherently harmful to black students and so was unconstitutional. Brown met with a campaign of resistance from
white Southerners, and for decades the federal courts attempted to enforce Brown’s mandate
against repeated attempts at circumvention. This resulted in the controversial desegregation
busing decrees handed down by federal courts in various parts of the nation. In Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 1 (2007), the Court ruled that race could not be the determinative
factor in determining to which public schools parents may transfer their children.In Plyler
v. Doe (1982) the Supreme Court struck down a Texas statute denying free public education
to illegal immigrants as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because discrimination on the basis of illegal immigration status did not further
a substantial state interest. The Court reasoned that illegal aliens and
their children, though not citizens of the United States or Texas, are people “in any
ordinary sense of the term” and, therefore, are afforded Fourteenth Amendment protections.In
Hernandez v. Texas (1954), the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment protects those
beyond the racial classes of white or “Negro” and extends to other racial and ethnic groups,
such as Mexican Americans in this case. In the half-century following Brown, the Court
extended the reach of the Equal Protection Clause to other historically disadvantaged
groups, such as women and illegitimate children, although it has applied a somewhat less stringent
standard than it has applied to governmental discrimination on the basis of race (United
States v. Virginia (1996); Levy v. Louisiana (1968).)The Supreme Court ruled in Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke (1978) that affirmative action in the form of racial
quotas in public university admissions was a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964; however, race could be used as one of several factors without violating of
the Equal Protection Clause or Title VI. In Gratz v. Bollinger (2003) and Grutter v.
Bollinger (2003), the Court considered two race-conscious admissions systems at the University
of Michigan. The university claimed that its goal in its
admissions systems was to achieve racial diversity. In Gratz, the Court struck down a points-based
undergraduate admissions system that added points for minority status, finding that its
rigidity violated the Equal Protection Clause; in Grutter, the Court upheld a race-conscious
admissions process for the university’s law school that used race as one of many factors
to determine admission. In Fisher v. University of Texas (2013), the
Court ruled that before race can be used in a public university’s admission policy, there
must be no workable race-neutral alternative. In Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative
Action (2014), the Court upheld the constitutionality of a state constitutional prohibition on the
state or local use of affirmative action.Reed v. Reed (1971), which struck down an Idaho
probate law favoring men, was the first decision in which the Court ruled that arbitrary gender
discrimination violated the Equal Protection Clause. In Craig v. Boren (1976), the Court ruled
that statutory or administrative sex classifications had to be subjected to an intermediate standard
of judicial review. Reed and Craig later served as precedents
to strike down a number of state laws discriminating by gender.Since Wesberry v. Sanders (1964)
and Reynolds v. Sims (1964), the Supreme Court has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause
as requiring the states to apportion their congressional districts and state legislative
seats according to “one man, one vote”. The Court has also struck down redistricting
plans in which race was a key consideration. In Shaw v. Reno (1993), the Court prohibited
a North Carolina plan aimed at creating majority-black districts to balance historic underrepresentation
in the state’s congressional delegations.The Equal Protection Clause served as the basis
for the decision in Bush v. Gore (2000), in which the Court ruled that no constitutionally
valid recount of Florida’s votes in the 2000 presidential election could be held within
the needed deadline; the decision effectively secured Bush’s victory in the disputed election. In League of United Latin American Citizens
v. Perry (2006), the Court ruled that House Majority Leader Tom DeLay’s Texas redistricting
plan intentionally diluted the votes of Latinos and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause.===State actor doctrine===Individual liberties guaranteed by the United
States Constitution, other than the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on slavery, protect not against
actions by private persons or entities, but only against actions by government officials. Regarding the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme
Court ruled in Shelley v. Kraemer (1948): “[T]he action inhibited by the first section
of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely
private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.” The court added in Civil Rights Cases (1883):
“It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is
not the subject matter of the amendment. It has a deeper and broader scope. It nullifies and makes void all State legislation,
and State action of every kind, which impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States, or which injures them in life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, or which denies to any of them the equal protection of the laws.” Vindication of federal constitutional rights
are limited to those situations where there is “state action” meaning action of government
officials who are exercising their governmental power. In Ex parte Virginia (1880), the Supreme Court
found that the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment “have reference to actions of the
political body denominated by a State, by whatever instruments or in whatever modes
that action may be taken. A State acts by its legislative, its executive,
or its judicial authorities. It can act in no other way. The constitutional provision, therefore, must
mean that no agency of the State, or of the officers or agents by whom its powers are
exerted, shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Whoever, by virtue of public position under
a State government, deprives another of property, life, or liberty, without due process of law,
or denies or takes away the equal protection of the laws, violates the constitutional inhibition;
and as he acts in the name and for the State, and is clothed with the State’s power, his
act is that of the State.”There are however instances where people are the victims of
civil-rights violations that occur in circumstances involving both government officials and private
actors. In the 1960s, the United States Supreme Court
adopted an expansive view of state action opening the door to wide-ranging civil-rights
litigation against private actors when they act as state actors (i.e., acts done or otherwise
“sanctioned in some way” by the state). The Court found that the state action doctrine
is equally applicable to denials of privileges or immunities, due process, and equal protection
of the laws.The critical factor in determining the existence of state action is not governmental
involvement with private persons or private corporations, but “the inquiry must be whether
there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the
regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the
State itself.” “Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances
can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true
significance.”The Supreme Court asserted that plaintiffs must establish not only that a
private party “acted under color of the challenged statute, but also that its actions are properly
attributable to the State. […]” “And the actions are to be attributable
to the State apparently only if the State compelled the actions and not if the State
merely established the process through statute or regulation under which the private party
acted.”The rules developed by the Supreme Court for business regulation are that (1)
the “mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not by itself convert
its action into that of the State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment,” and (2) “a State
normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive
power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must
be deemed to be that of the State.”==Apportionment of representation in House
of Representatives==Under Article I, Section 2, Clause 3, the
basis of representation of each state in the House of Representatives was determined by
adding three-fifths of each state’s slave population to its free population. Because slavery (except as punishment for
crime) had been abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment, the freed slaves would henceforth
be given full weight for purposes of apportionment. This situation was a concern to the Republican
leadership of Congress, who worried that it would increase the political power of the
former slave states, even as they continued to deny freed slaves the right to vote.Two
solutions were considered: reduce the Congressional representation of
the former slave states (for example, by basing representation on the number of legal voters
rather than the number of inhabitants) guarantee freed slaves the right to voteOn
January 31, 1866, the House of Representatives voted in favor of a proposed constitutional
amendment that would reduce a state’s representation in the House in proportion to which that state
used “race or color” as a basis to deny the right to vote in that state. The amendment failed in the Senate, partly
because radical Republicans foresaw that states would be able to use ostensibly race-neutral
criteria, such as educational and property qualifications, to disenfranchise the freed
slaves without negative consequence. So the amendment was changed to penalize states
in which the vote was denied to male citizens over twenty-one for any reason other than
participation in crime. Later, the Fifteenth Amendment was adopted
to guarantee the right to vote could not be denied based on race or color. The effect of Section 2 was twofold: Although the three-fifths clause was not formally
repealed, it was effectively removed from the Constitution. In the words of the Supreme Court in Elk v.
Wilkins, Section 2 “abrogated so much of the corresponding clause of the original Constitution
as counted only three-fifths of such persons [slaves]”. It was intended to penalize, by means of reduced
Congressional representation, states that withheld the franchise from adult male citizens
for any reason other than participation in crime. This, it was hoped, would induce the former
slave states to recognize the political rights of the former slaves, without directly forcing
them to do so—something that it was thought the states would not accept.===Enforcement===
The first reapportionment after the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment occurred in 1873,
based on the 1870 census. Congress appears to have attempted to enforce
the provisions of Section 2, but was unable to identify enough disenfranchised voters
to make a difference to any state’s representation. In the implementing statute, Congress added
a provision stating that should any state, after the passage of this Act, deny or abridge
the right of any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age,
and citizens of the United States, to vote at any election named in the amendments to
the Constitution, article fourteen, section two, except for participation in rebellion
or other crime, the number of Representatives apportioned in this act to such State shall
be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall have to the whole
number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. A nearly identical provision remains in federal
law to this day.Despite this legislation, in subsequent reapportionments, no change
has ever been made to any state’s Congressional representation on the basis of the Amendment. Bonfield, writing in 1960, suggested that
“[t]he hot political nature of such proposals has doomed them to failure”. Aided by this lack of enforcement, southern
states continued to use pretexts to prevent many blacks from voting until the passage
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.In the Fourth Circuit case of Saunders v Wilkins (1945),
Saunders claimed that Virginia should have its Congressional representation reduced because
of its use of a poll tax and other voting restrictions. The plaintiff sued for the right to run for
Congress at large in the state, rather than in one of its designated Congressional districts. The lawsuit was dismissed as a political question.===Influence===
Some have argued that Section 2 was implicitly repealed by the Fifteenth Amendment, but the
Supreme Court acknowledged the provisions of Section 2 in some later decisions. In Minor v. Happersett (1875), the Supreme
Court cited Section 2 as supporting its conclusion that the right to vote was not among the “privileges
and immunities of citizenship” protected by Section 1. In Richardson v. Ramirez (1974), the Court
cited Section 2 as justifying the states disenfranchising felons. In Hunter v. Underwood (1985), a case involving
disenfranchising black misdemeanants, the Supreme Court concluded that the Tenth Amendment
cannot save legislation prohibited by the subsequently enacted Fourteenth Amendment. More specifically the Court concluded that
laws passed with a discriminatory purpose are not excepted from the operation of the
Equal Protection Clause by the “other crime” provision of Section 2. The Court held that Section 2 “was not designed
to permit the purposeful racial discrimination […] which otherwise violates [Section] 1
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”===Criticism===
Abolitionist leaders criticized the amendment’s failure to specifically prohibit the states
from denying people the right to vote on the basis of race.Section 2 protects the right
to vote only of adult males, not adult females, making it the only provision of the Constitution
to explicitly discriminate on the basis of sex. Section 2 was condemned by women’s suffragists,
such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, who had long seen their cause as
linked to that of black rights. The separation of black civil rights from
women’s civil rights split the two movements for decades.==Participants in rebellion==
Section 3 prohibits the election or appointment to any federal or state office of any person
who had held any of certain offices and then engaged in insurrection, rebellion, or treason. However, a two-thirds vote by each House of
the Congress can override this limitation. In 1898, the Congress enacted a general removal
of Section 3’s limitation. In 1975, the citizenship of Confederate general
Robert E. Lee was restored by a joint congressional resolution, retroactive to June 13, 1865. In 1978, pursuant to Section 3, the Congress
posthumously removed the service ban from Confederate president Jefferson Davis.Section
3 was used to prevent Socialist Party of America member Victor L. Berger, convicted of violating
the Espionage Act for his anti-militarist views, from taking his seat in the House of
Representatives in 1919 and 1920.==Validity of public debt==
Section 4 confirmed the legitimacy of all public debt appropriated by the Congress. It also confirmed that neither the United
States nor any state would pay for the loss of slaves or debts that had been incurred
by the Confederacy. For example, during the Civil War several
British and French banks had lent large sums of money to the Confederacy to support its
war against the Union. In Perry v. United States (1935), the Supreme
Court ruled that under Section 4 voiding a United States bond “went beyond the congressional
power.”The debt-ceiling crises of 2011 and 2013 raised the question of what is the President’s
authority under Section 4. Some, such as legal scholar Garrett Epps,
fiscal expert Bruce Bartlett and Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, have argued that
a debt ceiling may be unconstitutional and therefore void as long as it interferes with
the duty of the government to pay interest on outstanding bonds and to make payments
owed to pensioners (that is, Social Security and Railroad Retirement Act recipients). Legal analyst Jeffrey Rosen has argued that
Section 4 gives the President unilateral authority to raise or ignore the national debt ceiling,
and that if challenged the Supreme Court would likely rule in favor of expanded executive
power or dismiss the case altogether for lack of standing. Erwin Chemerinsky, professor and dean at University
of California, Irvine School of Law, has argued that not even in a “dire financial emergency”
could the President raise the debt ceiling as “there is no reasonable way to interpret
the Constitution that [allows him to do so]”. Jack Balkin, Knight Professor of Constitutional
Law at Yale University, opined that like Congress the President is bound by the Fourteenth Amendment,
for otherwise, he could violate any part of the amendment at will. Because the President must obey the Section
4 requirement not to put the validity of the public debt into question, Balkin argued that
President Obama is obliged “to prioritize incoming revenues to pay the public debt:
interest on government bonds and any other ‘vested’ obligations. What falls into the latter category is not
entirely clear, but a large number of other government obligations—and certainly payments
for future services—would not count and would have to be sacrificed. This might include, for example, Social Security
payments.”==Power of enforcement==Section 5, also known as the Enforcement Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, enables Congress to pass laws enforcing the amendment’s other
provisions. In the Civil Rights Cases (1883), the Supreme
Court interpreted Section 5 narrowly, stating that “the legislation which Congress is authorized
to adopt in this behalf is not general legislation upon the rights of the citizen, but corrective
legislation”. In other words, the amendment authorizes Congress
to pass laws only to combat violations of the rights protected in other sections.In
Katzenbach v. Morgan (1966), the Court upheld Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
which prohibits certain forms of literacy requirements as a condition to vote, as a
valid exercise of Congressional power under Section 5 to enforce the Equal Protection
Clause. The Court ruled that Section 5 enabled Congress
to act both remedially and prophylactically to protect the rights guaranteed by the amendment. However, in City of Boerne v. Flores (1997),
the Court narrowed Congress’s enforcement power, holding that Congress may not enact
legislation under Section 5 that substantively defines or interprets Fourteenth Amendment
rights. The Court ruled that legislation is valid
under Section 5 only if there is a “congruence and proportionality” between the injury to
a person’s Fourteenth Amendment right and the means Congress adopted to prevent or remedy
that injury.==Selected Supreme Court cases=====Citizenship======Privileges or immunities======Incorporation======Substantive due process======Equal protection======Felon disenfranchisement===
1974: Richardson v. Ramirez 1985: Hunter v. Underwood===Power of enforcement=====See also==
United States constitutional criminal procedure United States labor law==References=====Notes======Citations======Bibliography===
Foner, Eric (1988). Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution,
1863–1877. HarperCollins. ISBN 9780062035868. Preview. Goldstone, Lawrence (2011). Inherently Unequal: The Betrayal of Equal
Rights by the Supreme Court, 1865–1903. Walker & Company. ISBN 9780802717924. Preview. Graber, Mark A. (November 2012). “Subtraction by addition?: The Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments”. Columbia
Law Review. 112 (7): 1501–1549. JSTOR 41708157. Archived from the original on November 17,
2015. Pdf. Soifer, Aviam (November 2012). “Federal protection, paternalism, and the
virtually forgotten prohibition of voluntary peonage”. Columbia Law Review. 112 (7): 1607–1639. JSTOR 41708160. Archived from the original on November 17,
2015. Pdf.==Further reading==
Bogen, David S. (April 30, 2003). Privileges and Immunities: A Reference Guide
to the United States Constitution. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 9780313313479. Retrieved March 19, 2013. Garber, Mark A. (2011). “Foreword: Plus or minus one: the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments”. Maryland Law Review, Special Issue: Symposium
– the Maryland Constitutional Law Schmooze. 71 (1): 12–20. Pdf.See also: Symposium: the Maryland Constitutional
Law Schmooze special issue of the Maryland Law Review.Halbrook, Stephen P. (1998). Freedmen, the 14th Amendment, and the Right
to Bear Arms, 1866–1876. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 9780275963316. Retrieved March 29, 2013. at Questia
tenBroek, Jacobus (June 1951). “Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States: Consummation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment”. California Law Review. 39 (2): 171–203. doi:10.2307/3478033. JSTOR 3478033. Pdf. McConnell, Michael W. (May 1995). “Originalism and the
desegregation decisions”. Virginia Law Review. 81 (4): 947–1140. doi:10.2307/1073539. JSTOR 1073539.Response to McConnell: Klarman,
Michael J. (October 1995). “Response: Brown, originalism, and constitutional
theory: a response to Professor Mcconnell”. Virginia Law Review. 81 (7): 1881–1936. doi:10.2307/1073643. JSTOR 1073643.Response to Klarman: McConnell,
Michael W. (October 1995). “Reply: The originalist justification for
Brown: a reply to Professor Klarman”. Virginia Law Review. 81 (7): 1937–1955. doi:10.2307/1073644. JSTOR 1073644.==External links==
“Amendments to the Constitution of the United States” (PDF). GPO Access. Archived from the original (PDF) on September
18, 2005. Retrieved September 11, 2005. (PDF, providing text of amendment and dates
of ratification) CRS Annotated Constitution: Fourteenth Amendment
Fourteenth Amendment and related resources at the Library of Congress

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