The Federalist Papers | Federalist No. 23
Articles,  Blog

The Federalist Papers | Federalist No. 23

FEDERALIST No. 23. The Necessity of a Government as Energetic
as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union From the New York Packet. Tuesday, December 18, 1787. HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York: THE necessity of a Constitution, at least
equally energetic with the one proposed, to the preservation of the Union, is the point
at the examination of which we are now arrived. This inquiry will naturally divide itself
into three branches—the objects to be provided for by the federal government, the quantity
of power necessary to the accomplishment of those objects, the persons upon whom that
power ought to operate. Its distribution and organization will more
properly claim our attention under the succeeding head. The principal purposes to be answered by union
are these—the common defense of the members; the preservation of the public peace as well
against internal convulsions as external attacks; the regulation of commerce with other nations
and between the States; the superintendence of our intercourse, political and commercial,
with foreign countries. The authorities essential to the common defense
are these: to raise armies; to build and equip fleets; to prescribe rules for the government
of both; to direct their operations; to provide for their support. These powers ought to exist without limitation,
THEM. The circumstances that endanger the safety
of nations are infinite, and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed
on the power to which the care of it is committed. This power ought to be coextensive with all
the possible combinations of such circumstances; and ought to be under the direction of the
same councils which are appointed to preside over the common defense. This is one of those truths which, to a correct
and unprejudiced mind, carries its own evidence along with it; and may be obscured, but cannot
be made plainer by argument or reasoning. It rests upon axioms as simple as they are
universal; the MEANS ought to be proportioned to the END; the persons, from whose agency
the attainment of any END is expected, ought to possess the MEANS by which it is to be
attained. Whether there ought to be a federal government
intrusted with the care of the common defense, is a question in the first instance, open
for discussion; but the moment it is decided in the affirmative, it will follow, that that
government ought to be clothed with all the powers requisite to complete execution of
its trust. And unless it can be shown that the circumstances
which may affect the public safety are reducible within certain determinate limits; unless
the contrary of this position can be fairly and rationally disputed, it must be admitted,
as a necessary consequence, that there can be no limitation of that authority which is
to provide for the defense and protection of the community, in any matter essential
to its efficacy that is, in any matter essential to the FORMATION, DIRECTION, or SUPPORT of
the NATIONAL FORCES. Defective as the present Confederation has
been proved to be, this principle appears to have been fully recognized by the framers
of it; though they have not made proper or adequate provision for its exercise. Congress have an unlimited discretion to make
requisitions of men and money; to govern the army and navy; to direct their operations. As their requisitions are made constitutionally
binding upon the States, who are in fact under the most solemn obligations to furnish the
supplies required of them, the intention evidently was that the United States should command
whatever resources were by them judged requisite to the “common defense and general welfare.” It was presumed that a sense of their true
interests, and a regard to the dictates of good faith, would be found sufficient pledges
for the punctual performance of the duty of the members to the federal head. The experiment has, however, demonstrated
that this expectation was ill-founded and illusory; and the observations, made under
the last head, will, I imagine, have sufficed to convince the impartial and discerning,
that there is an absolute necessity for an entire change in the first principles of the
system; that if we are in earnest about giving the Union energy and duration, we must abandon
the vain project of legislating upon the States in their collective capacities; we must extend
the laws of the federal government to the individual citizens of America; we must discard
the fallacious scheme of quotas and requisitions, as equally impracticable and unjust. The result from all this is that the Union
ought to be invested with full power to levy troops; to build and equip fleets; and to
raise the revenues which will be required for the formation and support of an army and
navy, in the customary and ordinary modes practiced in other governments. If the circumstances of our country are such
as to demand a compound instead of a simple, a confederate instead of a sole, government,
the essential point which will remain to be adjusted will be to discriminate the OBJECTS,
as far as it can be done, which shall appertain to the different provinces or departments
of power; allowing to each the most ample authority for fulfilling the objects committed
to its charge. Shall the Union be constituted the guardian
of the common safety? Are fleets and armies and revenues necessary
to this purpose? The government of the Union must be empowered
to pass all laws, and to make all regulations which have relation to them. The same must be the case in respect to commerce,
and to every other matter to which its jurisdiction is permitted to extend. Is the administration of justice between the
citizens of the same State the proper department of the local governments? These must possess all the authorities which
are connected with this object, and with every other that may be allotted to their particular
cognizance and direction. Not to confer in each case a degree of power
commensurate to the end, would be to violate the most obvious rules of prudence and propriety,
and improvidently to trust the great interests of the nation to hands which are disabled
from managing them with vigor and success. Who is likely to make suitable provisions
for the public defense, as that body to which the guardianship of the public safety is confided;
which, as the centre of information, will best understand the extent and urgency of
the dangers that threaten; as the representative of the WHOLE, will feel itself most deeply
interested in the preservation of every part; which, from the responsibility implied in
the duty assigned to it, will be most sensibly impressed with the necessity of proper exertions;
and which, by the extension of its authority throughout the States, can alone establish
uniformity and concert in the plans and measures by which the common safety is to be secured? Is there not a manifest inconsistency in devolving
upon the federal government the care of the general defense, and leaving in the State
governments the EFFECTIVE powers by which it is to be provided for? Is not a want of co-operation the infallible
consequence of such a system? And will not weakness, disorder, an undue
distribution of the burdens and calamities of war, an unnecessary and intolerable increase
of expense, be its natural and inevitable concomitants? Have we not had unequivocal experience of
its effects in the course of the revolution which we have just accomplished? Every view we may take of the subject, as
candid inquirers after truth, will serve to convince us, that it is both unwise and dangerous
to deny the federal government an unconfined authority, as to all those objects which are
intrusted to its management. It will indeed deserve the most vigilant and
careful attention of the people, to see that it be modeled in such a manner as to admit
of its being safely vested with the requisite powers. If any plan which has been, or may be, offered
to our consideration, should not, upon a dispassionate inspection, be found to answer this description,
it ought to be rejected. A government, the constitution of which renders
it unfit to be trusted with all the powers which a free people ought to delegate to any
government, would be an unsafe and improper depositary of the NATIONAL INTERESTS. Wherever THESE can with propriety be confided,
the coincident powers may safely accompany them. This is the true result of all just reasoning
upon the subject. And the adversaries of the plan promulgated
by the convention ought to have confined themselves to showing, that the internal structure of
the proposed government was such as to render it unworthy of the confidence of the people. They ought not to have wandered into inflammatory
declamations and unmeaning cavils about the extent of the powers. The POWERS are not too extensive for the OBJECTS
of federal administration, or, in other words, for the management of our NATIONAL INTERESTS;
nor can any satisfactory argument be framed to show that they are chargeable with such
an excess. If it be true, as has been insinuated by some
of the writers on the other side, that the difficulty arises from the nature of the thing,
and that the extent of the country will not permit us to form a government in which such
ample powers can safely be reposed, it would prove that we ought to contract our views,
and resort to the expedient of separate confederacies, which will move within more practicable spheres. For the absurdity must continually stare us
in the face of confiding to a government the direction of the most essential national interests,
without daring to trust it to the authorities which are indispensable to their proper and
efficient management. Let us not attempt to reconcile contradictions,
but firmly embrace a rational alternative. I trust, however, that the impracticability
of one general system cannot be shown. I am greatly mistaken, if any thing of weight
has yet been advanced of this tendency; and I flatter myself, that the observations which
have been made in the course of these papers have served to place the reverse of that position
in as clear a light as any matter still in the womb of time and experience can be susceptible
of. This, at all events, must be evident, that
the very difficulty itself, drawn from the extent of the country, is the strongest argument
in favor of an energetic government; for any other can certainly never preserve the Union
of so large an empire. If we embrace the tenets of those who oppose
the adoption of the proposed Constitution, as the standard of our political creed, we
cannot fail to verify the gloomy doctrines which predict the impracticability of a national
system pervading entire limits of the present Confederacy. PUBLIUS

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *